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McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem : ウィキペディア英語版 | McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem The McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem is a result in social choice theory. It states that if preferences are defined over a multidimensional policy space, then majority rule is in general unstable: there is no Condorcet winner. Furthermore, any point in the space can be reached from any other point by a sequence of majority votes. The theorem can be thought of as showing that Arrow's impossibility theorem holds when preferences are restricted to be concave in . The median voter theorem shows that when preferences are restricted to be single-peaked on the real line, Arrow's theorem does not hold, and the median voter's ideal point is a Condorcet winner. The chaos theorem shows that this good news does not continue in multiple dimensions. Richard McKelvey initially proved the theorem for Euclidean preferences. Norman Schofield extended the theorem to the more general class of concave preferences. ==References==
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』 ■ウィキペディアで「McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem」の詳細全文を読む
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